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As we prepare to close out a turbulent new year, the world faces uncertainty that evokes déjà vu, anger and, at times, the urge to look away. With so much attention rightfully focused on Ukraine, it’s understandably difficult to remind the world of the dangers of the Taliban’s campaign to turn Afghanistan into a reclusive kingdom. From there, leaders can shield themselves from external pressure and internal opposition without distance or distraction. give grace.
Not surprisingly, despite assurances from two US administrations that the Taliban have no choice but to work constructively with the world in a new beginning, the Taliban have historically followed a consistent religious guidebook. Decades of U.S. engagement failed to bring meaningful change to the Taliban, but they contributed to a now unacceptable version of the “Afghan dream” for millions of Afghans. .
Much of the debate surrounding US involvement in Afghanistan has been bewildered by an interesting paradox. Every time Washington pushed to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, it ironically created the conditions for them to stay in Afghanistan or come back later. That irony informs the current paradox that the country has never looked as safe or as dangerous as it does today under the Taliban regime. Yet, as it once was, Afghanistan’s heavy reliance on US cash and involvement for survival still reinforces US centrality in Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The truth is that the situation is as bad as it currently is in Afghanistan, and it could get worse, with the country’s decay to a lamp state or dystopian existence not confined to its own borders.
The return of the Taliban has turned the landscape of terrorism into a veritable commercial jihadist enterprise, enabling terrorist groups to feel a sense of kinship and some degree of obligation from years of cooperation. While conducting strong negotiations, development is facilitated under the Taliban’s protective umbrella as other forces regroup to establish tactical partnerships.
The Taliban have quietly strengthened or adjusted their own arrangements among troubling jihadist groups involving Pakistani, Uzbek, Tajik, Uyghur, Arab and Baloch groups. Taliban rulers are reportedly registering foreign fighters and issuing weapons permits and travel documents. At the same time, the Afghan branch of IS, ISIS-K, has emerged as the most athletically active group to rival the Taliban, whom it portrays as apostates and puppets of the West.
Externally, the Taliban have clashed with nearly all of their neighbors, regularly using the threat of belligerent violence to extract concessions. Despite determined efforts by China, Iran and Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors, none of the Taliban’s neighbors have been able to offer the Taliban enough to move away from regional jihadist groups. For example, Taliban cooperation largely depends on whether states in each region support or oppose anti-Taliban groups.
Domestically, the Taliban engage in class struggle to extend minority tyranny and consolidate power, acquire resources, and eliminate competition. This consolidation of power is done through a combination of vice and virtue politics, punishment and retribution, political alienation, and selective patronage. Sharia courts became widespread throughout the country, and the civilian bureaucracy was largely militarized and run by Taliban fighters. , continue to bear the brunt of isolation, hunger and unemployment.
The Taliban rulers united the strictly conservative Sunni Hanafi state, which assembled a clerical and executive power. Taliban clerics have established themselves as pioneers of purely Islamic leaders, each honing their own beliefs and how their religious legitimacy lends them political legitimacy. Moreover, Taliban leaders believe that a nationwide dialogue is not necessary to establish an acceptable government, even if they end up leading it. rule is to prove God’s favor to its leaders.
To avoid its previous fate, the Taliban carefully distributed power and authority over domestic policy, business partnerships, and diplomatic relations among close-knit circles close to Emir Haibatura Akunzada and, secondarily, Young Mullah Mohammad Yacoub, son of internationally wanted terrorist Sirajuddin Haqqani and the founder of the Taliban. However, as supreme clergy, the chief has the final say on all matters. He behaved in a much less caring manner than Haqqani and Yacoub about outward appearances that might work better in attracting international support and cooperation, or internal compromises to overcome political divisions. increase. Inside the Taliban, the new rulers primarily use patronage to ensure cohesion through appointments, distribution of revenue collections, distribution of land, etc.
While neither a progressive nor a friend of America, Haqqani’s international crime syndicates and illicit business interests, and Yacoub’s national political ambitions, do so endangering Afghanistan’s independence and freedom from external pressure. Yaqoob said in May 2022 that Haqqani will be televised on CNN in May 2022. Welcomed American media to his Kandahar compound in August 2022, following a televised and carefully scripted interview.
No Afghan group has emerged to definitively challenge the Taliban, and no organization commands long-term tactical or religious endurance like the Taliban. Washington has shown little willingness to muddle the already toxic waters by backing any of the fledgling and politically-controversial resistance organizations. Internally, this desperation has forced many ordinary Afghans to become contingent or part-time Taliban. Left behind or legally dangling, it calls into question America’s obligations to the thousands of Afghans with whom it has worked.
So far, the Taliban’s actions have not been irreversible, but their endurance will help Washington diversify its approach and potentially develop new sources of pressure and influence on the clerical staff. Requires leadership involvement. There is evidence of invisible engagement. In October, the State Department recognized an “interagency” US delegation, code for a group likely to include elements of US intelligence services, that met with Taliban managers in Qatar.
In December, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) released a communiqué regarding meetings in Abu Dhabi between Yaqoob and US special envoy for Afghanistan, Thomas West. Individual US agencies are likely pursuing their own direct contacts at the same time, some openly in Qatar and some perhaps more discreetly elsewhere, such as in the UAE. However, Haqqani and Yacoub do not operate without the full approval of the chief.
Such contacts would not be in direct contact with the rulers of Kandahar, but would ideally provide a common language for understanding the ideological priorities of the governing clergy and exploring areas of coordination and compromise. is intended to find As it develops, this engagement may benefit from deploying a special US liaison team to staff the small US diplomatic support facility in Kabul.
After all, there is no risk-free approach to dealing with the Taliban. The Taliban contains all the ingredients to destroy itself, endangering its neighbors and potentially forcing US involvement. But dialogue with ruling party clerics could help Washington integrate needed regional allies and enforcers. Their common interest is to mitigate the Taliban’s tendency to further destabilize extremists living within its borders. It provides a useful starting point to help support what may be urged towards acceptable engagement, which requires easing social restrictions and initiating a comprehensive national dialogue.
Correcting Washington’s Taliban policy could save the United States from the situation that would again force its handover. It starts with passing the Afghan Adjustment Act and working to influence rather than react to developments in Afghanistan.
Javid Ahmad is a Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council and Adjunct Fellow of the Middle East Institute. follow him on twitter @ahmadjavid.
Douglas London said,The Recruiter: Espionage and lost American intelligence technology.He teaches Intelligence in the Department of Foreign Affairs at Georgetown University and is an Adjunct Fellow at the Middle East Institute. London has served in the CIA’s classified services for over 34 years, of which he has served as chief of staff on three occasions. follow him on twitter @Douglas London 5.
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